道德情操论

亚当·斯密（Adam Smith，1723-1790），英国著名古典政治经济学家、哲学家、现代西方经济学之父。亚当·斯密1723年6月5日出生于苏格兰，青年时就读于牛津大学国；　1748-1751，任爱丁堡大学讲师，讲授经济学；1751-1764年，任格拉斯哥大学哲学教授，1759年出版了他的首部巨著《道德情操论》（The Theory of Moral Sentiments）。该书缔造了以“公民的幸福生活”为目标的伦理思想体系，从而确立了亚当·斯密在学术界的地位和威望。

《道德情操论》(中文导读英文版)The Theory of Moral Sentiments，中文译名为《道德情操论》，它由英国著名古典政治经济学家、现代西方经济学之父、哲学家亚当·斯密编著。这是一部划时代的巨著，是古典经济学的哲学基础。全书共有七卷，主要阐释道德情感的本质和道德评价的性质。书中列举了支配人类行为的各种动机，包括自爱、同情心、追求自由的欲望、正义感、劳动习惯和交换倾向等，认为一个人的同情心与思维构造是形成其独特的道德情操、道德判断及美德的基础；阐述了人本性中所有的同情的情感是形成其道德取向的基础，是人类正义感和其他一切道德情感的形成根源，由此说明道德评价的性质，以此为基础表明各种基本美德的特征，并向世人强调：道德和正义对于社会乃至市场经济的运行是非常重要的。

第一卷 论行为的适宜性 Part One Of the Propriety of Action 第一篇 论适宜性 SectionⅠ Of the Sense of Propriety 第一章 论同情 Chapter 1 Of Sympathy 第二章 论相互同情的快乐 Chapter 2 Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy 第三章 论比较他人的感情与我们的感情是否一致来判断他人感情是否适宜的方式 Chapter 3 Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the Affections of other Men, by their concord or dissonance with our own 第四章 续前章 Chapter 4 The same subject continued 第五章 论亲切的和值得尊敬的美德 Chapter 5 Of the amiable and respectable virtues 第二篇 论各种适宜的激情程度 Section Ⅱ Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety 引言 Introduction 第一章 论源于身体的激情 Chapter 1 Of the Passions which take their origin from the body 第二章 论源于某种特殊倾向或想象习惯的激情 Chapter 2 Of those Passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination 第三章 论不友好的激情 Chapter 3 Of the unsocial Passions 第四章 论友好的激情 Chapter 4 Of the social Passions 第五章 论自私的激情 Chapter 5 Of the selfish Passions 第三篇 论繁荣和灾祸对人们判断行为是否适宜所产生的影响；以及为什么在一种情形下比在另一种情况下更容易获得人们的认可 Section Ⅲ Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one state than in the other 第一章 虽然我们对悲伤的同情一般比对快乐的同情更为强烈，但是它通常远没有主要当事人自然感受到的强烈 Chapter 1 That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned 第二章 论野心的起源和社会阶层的区别 Chapter 2 Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks 第三章 论源于钦佩富人和大人物、轻视或忽视穷人和小人物的道德情操败坏 Chapter 3 Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition 第二卷 论优、缺点；报答与惩处的对象 Part Two Of Merit and Demerit; or of the Objects of Reward and Punishment 第一篇 论对优点和缺点的感觉 Section Ⅰ Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit 引言 Introduction 第一章 任何适宜的感激对象的行为显然应该得到报答；同样，任何适宜的愤恨对象的行为显然应该受到惩罚 Chapter 1 That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment 第二章 论适当的感激对象和适当的愤恨对象 Chapter 2 Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment 第三章 不认可施恩者的行为，就几乎不会同情受益者的感激；相反，对损人者的动机表示认同，对受难者的愤恨就不会有一点同情 Chapter 3 That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it 第四章 对前几章的概括 Chapter 4 Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters 第五章 对优点和缺点感觉的分析 Chapter 5 The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit 第二篇 论正义和仁慈 Section two Of Justice and Beneficence 第一章 两种美德的比较 Chapter 1 Comparison of those two virtues 第二章 论对正义、懊悔的感觉，兼论对优点的意识 Chapter 2 Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit 第三章 论这种天性构成的效用 Chapter 3 Of the utility of this constitution of Nature 第三篇 关于行为的优点或缺点，论命运对人类情感的影响 Section Ⅲ Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions 引言 Introduction 第一章 论这种命运产生影响的原因 Chapter 1 Of the causes of this Influence of Fortune 第二章 论这种命运产生影响的程度 Chapter 2 Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune 第三章 论这种无规律情感变化的最终原因 Chapter 3 Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments 第三卷 论评判自己的情感和行为的基础，兼论责任感 Part Three Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty 第一章 论自我认同和不认同的原则 Chapter 1 Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation 第二章 论对赞扬和值得赞扬的喜欢；兼论对责备和该受责备的恐惧 Chapter 2 Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness 第三章 论良心的威信和影响 Chapter 3 Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience 第四章 论自欺欺人的本性，兼论一般准则的起源和用途 Chapter 4 Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the origin and Use of general Rules 第五章 论道德的通常规则的影响和威信，以及它们被公正地看作神的法则 Chapter 5 Of the influence and authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity 第六章 在何种情况下，责任感应该成为人们行为的唯一准则；在何种情况下，它应该同其他动机一起发生作用 Chapter 6 In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives 第四卷 论效用对认同情感的作用 Part Four Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiment of Approbation 第一章 论效用的表现赋予所有艺术作品的美，兼论这种美所具有的广泛影响 Chapter 1 Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of Art, and of the extensive influence of this species of Beauty 第二章 论效用的表现赋予人的行为和品格的美，以及关于这种美的概念可能在何种程度上被看成一种原始的认同原则 Chapter 2 Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation 第五卷 习惯和风气对认同的与不认同的道德情操的影响 Part Five Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation 第一章 论习惯和风气施加于人们对美和丑看法的影响 Chapter 1 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our notions of Beauty and Deformity 第二章 论习惯和风气对道德情感的影响 Chapter 2 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments 第六卷 论美德的品格 Part Six Of the Character of Virtue 引言 Introduction 第一篇 论个人的品格，就它对其幸福的影响而言；或论谨慎 SECTION Ⅰ Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence 第二篇 论个人的品格，就它对其他人幸福的影响 SECTION Ⅱ Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People 引言 Introduction 第一章 论天性致使个人成为我们关心和注意的对象所依据的次序 Chapter 1 Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our Care and Attention 第二章 论天性使社会团体成为人们行善对象的次序 Chapter 2 Of the Order in which societies are by Nature recommended to our Beneficence 第三章 论世界性的行善 Chapter 3 Of universal Benevolence 第三篇 论自我支配 SECTION Ⅲ Of Self-command 第六卷的结论 Conclusion of the Sixth Part 第七卷 论道德的哲学体系 Part Seven Of Systems of Moral Philosophy 第一篇 论应当在道德情感理论中考虑的问题 SECTION Ⅰ Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments 第二篇 论已对美德的本质做出的各种说明 SECTION Ⅱ Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue 引言 Introduction 第一章 论认为美德存在于适宜性之中的那些体系 Chapter 1 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety 第二章 论认为美德存在于谨慎之中的那些体系 Chapter 2 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence 第三章 论认为美德存在于善行之中的那些体系 Chapter 3 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence 第四章 论放肆的体系 Chapter 4 Of licentious Systems 第三篇 论已经形成的有关认同原则的各种体系 SECTION Ⅲ Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation 引言 Introduction 第一章 论从自爱推断出认同原则的那些体系 Chapter 1 Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from self-love 第二章 论把理性看成认同原则的根源的那些体系 Chapter 2 Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation 第三章 论把情感看成认同原则的根源的那些体系 Chapter 3 Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation 第四篇 论不同的作者论述道德实践规则的方式 SECTION Ⅳ Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality